Tuesday, September 18, 2012

VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS vs. SALUD (A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005)


Facts: 

Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. On appeal, the case was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond.

Lagua’s bond was approved in a Resolution dated November 6, 2003, where the appellate court also directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang, for promulgation.

Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the respondent’s unusual interest in the Lagua case. The respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found. Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, and to notify the mailing section that there were orders requiring personal service. At around 4:00 p.m., the respondent then went to Atty. Madarang’s office and assisted in arranging and stapling the papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section.

On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of release in the Lagua case. The respondent left the prison compound at around 2:30 p.m. 

In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative. It was about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s relative.

What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarang’s Affidavit dated December 8, 2003, as follows:

xxx xxx

6.      That I got Salud’s mobile phone number from Ms. Secarro and started texting him at about the same time Ms. Secarro did. I represented myself as Arlyn, Lagua’s relative. Most of his text messages are still stored in my mobile phone. In fact, I received one text message from him while I was at the office of Justice Magtolis, (the Chairman of the 6th Division and the ponente of C.R. No. 27423) in the late afternoon of November 7, 2003 while reporting to her this incident. Those stored in my phone are the following:

1. bkit, C rhodora to. 639204439082. – Nov. 2003, 15:36:15

2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO – 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:14:47

3. SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI – 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:40:21

4. TAWAG K S AKIN – 639204439082 – 7 Nov 2003 17:18:47

5. NARELEASE N C MR. LAGUA. NAGKITA N B KAYO – 639204439082-7 Nov 2003 19:44:52

6. Magkano b and binigay nyo sa middle nyo. Puede bang malaman – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:32:05

7. Gud evening. May gusto lng akong malaman. Sana alang makaalam kahit cino. Lito – 639184470111–7 Nov. 2003 19:54:20

8. Cno ang kausap n Rhodora. Pwede bang malaman – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:37:57

9. May landline ka. Tawagan kta bukas nang umaga – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:56:31

10. Wag s Court of Appeal. Txt na lang kta kung saan. – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:52:58

11. Gusto mo bukas nang umaga magkita tyo. 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003 20:57:10

12. D ba pwede bukas tyo kita. May gusto lang ako malaman – 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:02:41

13. D 2ngkol kay rhodora duon sa kasama ko kaninang lalakeng pinsan – 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003, 21:04:28

14. Ala po ako sa Lunes sa opis. Sa hapon po puede kyo – 639184470111, 7 Nov  2003 21:07:23

15. Kay Melchor Lagua 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003 21:08:19

16. Kasama ko cya kanina nang lumabas – 639184470111 – 7 Nov. 2003 21:13:05

17. Ano m ba Melchor Lagua – 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003 21:15:52

18. Between 5 and 5:30 ng hapon. Bkit. 639184470111 – 7 Nov. 2003 21:54:24

19. 3 PM PUWEDE KB – 639004039082 10 Nov 2003 12:09:32

20. Kilala mo b c rhodora. Nagkita na b kayo. Ala naman problema sa kanya. Ok naman 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003, 21:57:13

21. MAGKITA N LANG TAYO – 639204439082 – 10 Nov. 2003, 12:20:16

22. A, OK, NAGKITA N B KAYO NG KAMAGANAK MO – 639204439082 – 10 Nov 2003 15:12:14

23. D TALAGA AKO DARATING DAHIL WALA AKONG KAILANGAN S IYO. – 639204439082 – 10 Nov 2003 18:36:03

7.      That Salud called me up in the morning of November 8, 2003 at around 7:33 but I purposely did not answer him. Why did he need to call me up?

8.      That I personally called up the Bureau of Prisons for the exact time the Order of Release was delivered and when accused appellant Lagua was released. I learned that the Order of Release was received at 9:15 A.M. and that Lagua was released between 5-5:30 P.M. of November 7, 2003.

9.      That I was able to talk to Rhodora Valdez the following Monday, November 10, 2003. Again, I introduced myself as Lagua’s relative, Arlyn and told her I only wanted to know how much more we had to pay for Lagua’s release. She refused to entertain me because according to her, “Hindi ikaw ang kausap ko. Duda ako sa yo. Kung gusto mo, puntahan mo ako dito bukas, para magkita tayo. Pero lumabas na si Lagua. Itinawag sa akin ni Lito Salud.” Then, she [hung] up.

10.  That on Tuesday, November 11, 2003, I brought Salud, accompanied by Ms. Secarro to Justice Magtolis. Out of the confrontation, we discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel, Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo of the Quimpo Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates. He gave them to a certain Art, allegedly Lagua’s relative who he claimed approached him at the Bureau of Prisons in the morning of November 7, 2003. He told Justice Magtolis that he gave these documents to Art, who promised to take care of them, even before he could deliver the copy addressed to the Director of Prisons. He never mentioned that this Art was connected with the office of accused-appellant’s counsel. Because of this information from Salud himself, I did not sign the Certificate of Service, Annex “C”.

11.  That several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms. Secarro, came to my office to apologize. But before he could even say a word, he broke down in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he uttered, “Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak.”

On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. Justice Magtolis then called the respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie L. Gatmaitan, who stated that she would transfer the respondent to another office which has nothing to do with cases.

Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of the text messages as evidence against Salud constitutes a violation of his right to privacy?

DECISION:

Indeed, the complainant in administrative proceedings has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence. If a court employee is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him must be competent and derived from direct knowledge; as such, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. Thus, if the complainant fails to substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery, relying on mere conjectures and suppositions, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit. However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.  The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.

To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To determine which contradicting statements of a witness is to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received must be considered. Thus, while it is true that there is no direct evidence that the respondent received any money to “facilitate” the release of detained Lagua, the following circumstances must be taken as contrary to the respondent’s plea of innocence:

First. The respondent admitted that he was the sender of the first three text messages in Atty. Madarang’s cellphone: “bkit, C rhodora to”; “CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO”; and “SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI.”

As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, the respondent’s claim of “joking around” (“nakipaglokohan”) with an unknown sender of a text message by replying thereto is contrary to a normal person’s reaction. This is made even more apparent by the fact that the respondent even admitted that he called Atty. Madarang twice, and when asked why, gave a vague answer, and, when further questioned, even broke down in tears. 

The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

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