VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS vs. SALUD (A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005)

Facts: 

Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163. On appeal, the case was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. Lagua, who was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding the petition well-taken, the appellate court issued a Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to post a P200,000.00 bond.

Lagua’s bond was approved in a Resolution dated November 6, 2003, where the appellate court also directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang, for promulgation.

Irma Del Rosario, Utility Worker, noticed the respondent’s unusual interest in the Lagua case. The respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an order of release in the said case and was initially told there was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case were eventually found. Atty. Madarang then directed the typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, and to notify the mailing section that there were orders requiring personal service. At around 4:00 p.m., the respondent then went to Atty. Madarang’s office and assisted in arranging and stapling the papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and other papers himself to the Mailing Section.

On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of release in the Lagua case. The respondent left the prison compound at around 2:30 p.m. 

In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative. It was about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Lagua’s relative.

What transpired thereafter is contained in Atty. Madarang’s Affidavit dated December 8, 2003, as follows:

xxx xxx

6.      That I got Salud’s mobile phone number from Ms. Secarro and started texting him at about the same time Ms. Secarro did. I represented myself as Arlyn, Lagua’s relative. Most of his text messages are still stored in my mobile phone. In fact, I received one text message from him while I was at the office of Justice Magtolis, (the Chairman of the 6^th Division and the ponente of C.R. No. 27423) in the late afternoon of November 7, 2003 while reporting to her this incident. Those stored in my phone are the following:

1. bkit, C rhodora to. 639204439082. – Nov. 2003, 15:36:15

2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO – 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:14:47

3. SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI – 639204439082, 7 Nov 2003 16:40:21

4. TAWAG K S AKIN – 639204439082 – 7 Nov 2003 17:18:47

5. NARELEASE N C MR. LAGUA. NAGKITA N B KAYO – 639204439082-7 Nov 2003 19:44:52

6. Magkano b and binigay nyo sa middle nyo. Puede bang malaman – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:32:05

7. Gud evening. May gusto lng akong malaman. Sana alang makaalam kahit cino. Lito – 639184470111–7 Nov. 2003 19:54:20

8. Cno ang kausap n Rhodora. Pwede bang malaman – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:37:57

9. May landline ka. Tawagan kta bukas nang umaga – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:56:31

10. Wag s Court of Appeal. Txt na lang kta kung saan. – 639184470111-7 Nov 2003 20:52:58

11. Gusto mo bukas nang umaga magkita tyo. 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003 20:57:10

12. D ba pwede bukas tyo kita. May gusto lang ako malaman – 639184470111 7 Nov 2003 21:02:41

13. D 2ngkol kay rhodora duon sa kasama ko kaninang lalakeng pinsan – 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003, 21:04:28

14. Ala po ako sa Lunes sa opis. Sa hapon po puede kyo – 639184470111, 7 Nov  2003 21:07:23

15. Kay Melchor Lagua 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003 21:08:19

16. Kasama ko cya kanina nang lumabas – 639184470111 – 7 Nov. 2003 21:13:05

17. Ano m ba Melchor Lagua – 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003 21:15:52

18. Between 5 and 5:30 ng hapon. Bkit. 639184470111 – 7 Nov. 2003 21:54:24

19. 3 PM PUWEDE KB – 639004039082 10 Nov 2003 12:09:32

20. Kilala mo b c rhodora. Nagkita na b kayo. Ala naman problema sa kanya. Ok naman 639184470111 – 7 Nov 2003, 21:57:13

21. MAGKITA N LANG TAYO – 639204439082 – 10 Nov. 2003, 12:20:16

22. A, OK, NAGKITA N B KAYO NG KAMAGANAK MO – 639204439082 – 10 Nov 2003 15:12:14

23. D TALAGA AKO DARATING DAHIL WALA AKONG KAILANGAN S IYO. – 639204439082 – 10 Nov 2003 18:36:03

7.      That Salud called me up in the morning of November 8, 2003 at around 7:33 but I purposely did not answer him. Why did he need to call me up?

8.      That I personally called up the Bureau of Prisons for the exact time the Order of Release was delivered and when accused appellant Lagua was released. I learned that the Order of Release was received at 9:15 A.M. and that Lagua was released between 5-5:30 P.M. of November 7, 2003.

9.      That I was able to talk to Rhodora Valdez the following Monday, November 10, 2003. Again, I introduced myself as Lagua’s relative, Arlyn and told her I only wanted to know how much more we had to pay for Lagua’s release. She refused to entertain me because according to her, “Hindi ikaw ang kausap ko. Duda ako sa yo. Kung gusto mo, puntahan mo ako dito bukas, para magkita tayo. Pero lumabas na si Lagua. Itinawag sa akin ni Lito Salud.” Then, she [hung] up.

10.  That on Tuesday, November 11, 2003, I brought Salud, accompanied by Ms. Secarro to Justice Magtolis. Out of the confrontation, we discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel, Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo of the Quimpo Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates. He gave them to a certain Art, allegedly Lagua’s relative who he claimed approached him at the Bureau of Prisons in the morning of November 7, 2003. He told Justice Magtolis that he gave these documents to Art, who promised to take care of them, even before he could deliver the copy addressed to the Director of Prisons. He never mentioned that this Art was connected with the office of accused-appellant’s counsel. Because of this information from Salud himself, I did not sign the Certificate of Service, Annex “C”.

11.  That several days later, Salud accompanied by Ms. Secarro, came to my office to apologize. But before he could even say a word, he broke down in [wails]. In between his loud cries, he uttered, “Boss, patawad po, alang-alang sa aking mga anak.”

On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. Justice Magtolis then called the respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie L. Gatmaitan, who stated that she would transfer the respondent to another office which has nothing to do with cases.

Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of the text messages as evidence against Salud constitutes a violation of his right to privacy?

DECISION:

Indeed, the complainant in administrative proceedings has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence. If a court employee is to be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him must be competent and derived from direct knowledge; as such, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence. Thus, if the complainant fails to substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery, relying on mere conjectures and suppositions, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit. However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.  The findings of investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.

To determine the credibility and probative weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To determine which contradicting statements of a witness is to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received must be considered. Thus, while it is true that there is no direct evidence that the respondent received any money to “facilitate” the release of detained Lagua, the following circumstances must be taken as contrary to the respondent’s plea of innocence:

First. The respondent admitted that he was the sender of the first three text messages in Atty. Madarang’s cellphone: “bkit, C rhodora to”; “CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG PANGALAN MO”; and “SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI.”

As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, the respondent’s claim of “joking around” (“nakipaglokohan”) with an unknown sender of a text message by replying thereto is contrary to a normal person’s reaction. This is made even more apparent by the fact that the respondent even admitted that he called Atty. Madarang twice, and when asked why, gave a vague answer, and, when further questioned, even broke down in tears. 

The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

NAPOCOR vs. HON. CODILLA, JR. (G.R. No. 170491, April 4, 2007)

FACTS:

On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on petitioner’s power barges.

Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8 July 1996 impleading herein private respondent Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. On 18 September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss which was subsequently denied by public respondent Judge in an Order dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai Shipping Co. likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss which was also denied by public respondent Judge in an Order issued on 24 January 2003.

Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to petitioner’s formal offer of evidence.

On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings. According to the court a quo:

The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion to strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic Evidence (Comment to Defendant Wallem Philippines’ Objections and Motion to Strike).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the photocopies offered by the petitioner as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based on petitioner’s interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence that these photocopies are electronic evidence?

DECISION:

In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not the photocopies are indeed electronic documents as contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall enumerate the following documents offered as evidence by the petitioner, to wit:

1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten date;

2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost of damages of petitioner’s power barges 207 and 209 prepared by Hopewell Mobile Power Systems Corporation and manually signed by Messrs. Rex Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;

3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;

4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine Protest Form which was filled up and accomplished by Rex Joel C. Malaluan in his own handwriting and signed by him. Portions of the Jurat were handwritten, and manually signed by the Notary Public;

5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received;

6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the estimated energy loss allegedly suffered by petitioner which was manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr.;

7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the breakdown of the cost estimate, manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the date it was received, and other handwritten notations;

8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum written using a manual typewriter, signed manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los Reyes, with a handwritten notation when it was received by the party;

9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of a portion of the electricity supply and operation and maintenance agreement between petitioner and Hopewell, containing handwritten notations and every page containing three unidentified manually placed signatures;

10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of Termination with attachments addressed to Rex Joel C. Malaluan, manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with a handwritten notation of the date it was received. The sub-markings also contain manual signatures and/or handwritten notations;

11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination with attachments addressed to VIrgilio Asprer and manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings contain manual signatures and/or handwritten notations;

12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document marked as Annex C;

13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista and by the Notary Public, with other handwritten notations;

14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary Public, together with other handwritten notations.

On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.

The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.

Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in denying admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.

ZALDY NUEZ vs. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO (A.M. No. CA-05-18-P, April 12, 2005)

FACTS:

Complainant’s case referred to above had been pending with the CA for more than two years. Complainant filed an illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).  The CSC ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former job pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an expeditious decision of his case, complainant sought the assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after learning of the latter’s employment with the CA from her sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone conversation and thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS, complainant informed respondent of the particulars of his pending case.  Allegedly, complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case.

However, a week after their first telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind of money since he had been jobless for a long time, to which respondent replied, "Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh. Kung wala kang pera, pasensiya na." Complainant then tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her but by the person who was going to make the decision.  Respondent even admonished complainant with the words "Wala tayo sa palengke iho!" when the latter bargained for a lower amount.

Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or not to pay the money in exchange for the decision. Instead, in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador. The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCF-SPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up a meeting with her.  Upon learning that respondent’s offer of a favorable decision in exchange for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.

On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the first time in person at the 2^nd Floor of Jollibee, Times Plaza Bldg., the place where the entrapment operation was later conducted.  Patricia Siringan (Siringan), a researcher of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and posed as his sister-in-law. During the meeting, complainant clarified from respondent that if he gave the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision. This was confirmed by the latter together with the assurance that it would take about a month for the decision to come out. Respondent also explained that the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable decision only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme Court should the case be appealed later.

When respondent was asked where the money will go, she claimed that it will go to a male researcher whose name she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer in the CA Fifth (5^th) Division where complainant case was pending. She also claimed that she will not get any part of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some.

Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower amount during the meeting but respondent asserted that the amount was fixed.  She even explained that this was their second transaction and the reason why the amount was closed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was because on a previous occasion, only Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) was paid by the client despite the fact that the amount had been pegged at One Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,300,000.00). Complainant then proposed that he pay a down payment of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the balance of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) will be paid once the decision had been released. However, respondent refused to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having learned their lesson from their previous experience for as then, the client no longer paid the balance of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come out.

Complainant brought along copies of the documents pertinent to his case during the first meeting.  After reading through them, respondent allegedly uttered, "Ah, panalo ka." The parties set the next meeting date at lunchtime on 28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money would be handed over by complainant to respondent then.

On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF agents, namely: Capt. Reynaldo Maclang (Maclang) as team leader, SPO1 Renato Banay (Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena (Villena), PO1 Danny Feliciano, and PO2 Edgar delos Reyes arrived at around 11:30 in the morning at Jollibee. Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated themselves at the table beside the one occupied by the two (2) agents, Banay and Villena. Complainant had with him an unsealed long brown envelope containing ten (10) bundles of marked money and paper money which was to be given to respondent. The envelope did not actually contain the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) demanded by respondent, but instead contained paper money in denominations of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), as well as newspaper cut-outs. There were also ten (10) authentic One Hundred Peso (P100.00) bills which had been previously dusted with ultra-violet powder by the PAOCTF. The three other PAOCTF agents were seated a few tables away and there were also three (3) crew members from Imbestigador at another table operating a mini DV camera that was secretly recording the whole transaction.

Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m. She appeared very nervous and suspicious during the meeting. Ironically, she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her, precisely like those that were shown onImbestigador. She thus refused to receive the money then and there. What she proposed was for complainant and Siringan to travel with her in a taxi and drop her off at the CA where she would receive the money.

More irony ensued.  Respondent actually said that she felt there were policemen around and she was afraid that once she took hold of the envelope complainant proffered, she would suddenly be arrested and handcuffed. At one point, she even said, "Ayan o, tapos na silang kumain, bakit hindi pa sila umaalis?," referring to Banay and Villena at the next table. To allay respondent’s suspicion, the two agents stood up after a few minutes and went near the staircase where they could still see what was going on.

Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for almost one hour. Complainant and Siringan bargained for a lower price but respondent refused to accede. When respondent finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and invited her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters at United Nations Avenue for questioning.

On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle, Banay asked respondent why she went to the restaurant. The latter replied that she went there to get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).

Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was previously dusted on the money.  She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters.

At seven o’clock in the evening of 28 September 2004, respondent called Atty. Lilia Mercedes Encarnacion Gepty (Atty. Gepty), her immediate superior in the CA at the latter’s house. She tearfully confessed to Atty. Gepty that "she asked for money for a case and was entrapped by police officers and the media." Enraged at the news, Atty. Gepty asked why she had done such a thing to which respondent replied, "Wala lang ma’am, sinubukan ko lang baka makalusot." Respondent claimed that she was ashamed of what she did and repented the same.  She also asked for Atty. Gepty’s forgiveness and help. The latter instead reminded respondent of the instances when she and her co-employees at the CA were exhorted during office meetings never to commit such offenses.

Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report of her conversation with their division’s chairman, Justice Martin S. Villarama.  She reduced the report into writing and submitted the same to then PJ Cancio Garcia on 29 September 2004. She also later testified as to the contents of her report to the Committee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the text messages are admissible in evidence?

DECISION:

Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable decision of the former’s pending case with the CA.  The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:

"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.  Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. vs. SSANGYONG CORP. (G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007)

FACTS:

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.

Following the failure of MCC to open a letters of credit to facilitate the payment of imported stainless steel products, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.

Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Orde and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. According to the aforesaid Order, considering that both testimonial and documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.

ISSUE:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible in evidence as such?

DECISION:

R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.

Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."

In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data message."We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.

ESCALONA vs. PADILLO (A.M. No. P-10-2785, September 21, 2010)

FACTS:

Complainant Lourdes S. Escalona (Escalona) filed on 22 January 2007 a complaint charging respondent Consolacion S. Padillo (Padillo), Court Stenographer III of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Branch 260, Parañaque City with Grave Misconduct. Escalona claimed that she approached Jun Limcaco (Limcaco), the president of their homeowners’ association, regarding her problem with Loresette Dalit (Dalit). Limcaco referred her to Padillo to help facilitate the filing of a case against Dalit. Padillo allegedly promised to prepare the necessary documents and asked for P20,000 purportedly as payment for the prosecutor. Escalona requested that the amount be reduced to P15,000. Padillo received the P15,000 at the Little Quiapo Branch Better Living Subdivision. Thereafter, Escalona received a text message from Padillo informing her that the prosecutor was not amenable to the reduced amount of P15,000. After two weeks, Escalona gave the balance of P5,000 to Padillo allegedly for the service of the warrant of arrest. Escalona was also asked to submit a barangay clearance and to first take an oath before Prosecutor Antonio Arquiza, Jr. and later before Prosecutor Napoleon Ramolete. However, subsequent verification from the Prosecutor’s Office showed no record of a case filed against Dalit. Escalona confronted Padillo who promised to return to her the money. Padillo reneged on her promise. Hence, this complaint.

Meanwhile, Escalona withdrew her complaint against Padillo in a Sworn Affidavit of Desistance dated 10 July 2007 alleging that Padillo already returned to her the P20,000. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not Padillo is guilty of Grave Misconduct?

DECISION:

There is no doubt that Padillo received from Escalona P20,000 purportedly "for fiscal & judge" and "for warrant officer" and this amount was "intended to facilitate" the case against Dalit. This is shown in the receipt signed by Padillo herself.

Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct of Court Personnel provides that "(C)ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions." Section 52 (A)(11) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service also provides that dismissal is the penalty for improper solicitation even if it is the first offense. Section 58(a) of the same Rule provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.

TORRES vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011)

FACTS:

Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR, and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of eitherP50,000.00 or P35,000.00. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.

On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr., Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of the charge of dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was then required to explain in writing within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately until further orders.

On May 7, 2007, petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation of the charges against him. He denied any involvement or participation in any fraudulent manipulation of the CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a formal investigation of the accusations against him.

On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human Resource and Development Department, dismissing him from the service.

On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits. The complaint alleged among other things, that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the members of the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board and that no resolution was issued on his letter reconsideration.

Thereafter, the CSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the same has already prescribed.

After the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Torres elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which likewise dismissed his petition on the same ground.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sending of his letter of reconsideration by means of a fax machine is a valid mode of filing a letter of reconsideration?

DECISION:

A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.

Petitioner received a copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However, records do not show that petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the non-receipt of petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by certifications issued by PAGCOR employees.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. As we stated earlier, the motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or personal delivery.

In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings through fax machines and ruled that:

A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.

xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.xxx

Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act.

We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.